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Abstract—We propose a strikingly novel, simple, and effective
approach to model online user behavior: we extract and analyze
digital DNA sequences from user online actions and we use
Twitter as a benchmark to test our proposal. We obtain an
incisive and compact DNA-inspired characterization of user
actions. Then, we apply standard DNA analysis techniques to
discriminate between genuine and spambot accounts on Twitter.
An experimental campaign supports our proposal, showing its
effectiveness and viability. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first ones to identify and adapt DNA-inspired techniques
to online user behavioral modeling. While Twitter spambot
detection is a specific use case on a specific social media, our
proposed methodology is platform and technology agnostic, hence
paving the way for diverse behavioral characterization tasks.
Index Terms—I.2.4 Knowledge representation formalisms and
methods; H.2.8.d Data mining; O.8.15 Social science methods or
tools
I. ONLINE INTERACTIONS: THE MIRROR OF THE SOUL
Social media provide internet users with the opportunity to
interact for a myriads of goals, which range from planning
social events to engaging in commercial transactions.
Modeling and analyzing online user behaviors deserves
attention for a variety of reasons. One is to mine substantial
information regarding events of public interest [1]. In addition,
linking behaviors to a ground truth in the past leads to predict
what will likely happen in the future when similar behaviors
take place [2]. Furthermore, online behavioral analysis helps in
detecting fictitious and deceitful accounts that may distribute
spam or lead to a bias in the public opinion [3].
Current research on online behaviors exploits different
techniques, relying, e.g., on social and interaction graphs [4],
[5], textual content [1], [6], and other complex data rep-
resentations [2]. The definition of a unifying approach is
an open challenge. Thus, we introduce the novel notion of
digital DNA sequences to characterize online user behaviors
on social media. We believe that the high flexibility that
is a feature of digital DNA sequences, makes this original
modeling technique well suited for different scenarios, with
the potential to open up new directions for research. By
drawing a parallel with biological DNA, it also opens up the
possibility to draw upon decades of research and development
in bioinformatics.
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We envisage digital DNA sequences to embrace different
applications, among which:
• letting behavioral patterns emerge from the crowd [2],
[5], by making use of standard DNA sequence alignment
tools. This automated approach has the reassuring out-
come of avoiding the often frustrating intervention of
humans, who may not have the means to discriminate
patterns by simply inspecting them on an “account-by-
account” basis;
• defining a behavioral-based taxonomy of online interac-
tions. For social media, this might mean classifying users
as compulsive, curious, lazy, inactive. Such information
could then be exploited to launch ad-hoc marketing cam-
paigns and to convey specific messages to those accounts
that are more likely to accept such suggestions.
II. CONCEPT AND INSTANCES OF DIGITAL DNA
A. Biological DNA
The human genome is the complete set of genetic in-
formation on humans (Homo sapiens), encoded as nucleic
acid (DNA) sequences. DNA sequences are successions of
characters (i.e., strings), indicating the order of nucleotides
within DNA molecules. The possible characters are A, C,
G, and T, representing the four nucleotide bases of a DNA
strand: adenine, cytosine, guanine, thymine. Biological DNA
stores the information directing functions and characteristics
of a living organism. DNA sequences are analyzed by means
of bioinformatics techniques. Sequence alignment and motif
elicitation are among the most well-known analysis techniques
to find sequence commonalities and repetitions. Via an analysis
of common sub-sequences, it is possible to predict specific
characteristics of the individual and to uncover relationships
between different individuals.
B. Digital DNA as a proxy of user online behavior
Inspired by biological DNA, we propose to model online
user behaviors with strings of characters representing the
sequence of a user’s online actions. Each action type (e.g.,
posting new content, following or replying to a user) can
be encoded with a different character, similarly to DNA se-
quences, where characters encode nucleotide bases. According
to this paradigm, online user actions represent the bases of
their digital DNA.
Different kinds of user behaviors can be observed on the
Internet [6] and digital DNA is a flexible and compact way of
modeling such behaviors. Its flexibility lies in the possibility
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to choose which actions will form the sequence. For example,
digital DNA sequences on Facebook could include a different
base for each user-to-user interaction type: comments (C),
likes (L), shares (S) and mentions (M). Then, interactions are
encoded as strings formed by such characters, according to
the sequence of actions users perform. Similarly, user-to-item
interactions on an e-commerce platform could be modeled
using a base for every product category. User purchasing
behaviors could be encoded as a sequence of characters,
according to the category of products they buy. To this regard,
digital DNA shows a major difference to biological DNA,
where the four nucleotide bases are fixed. In digital DNA,
both the number and the meaning of the bases can change
according to the behavior/interaction to be modeled. Similarly
to its biological predecessor, digital DNA is a compact repre-
sentation of information. For example, the timeline of a Twitter
user could be encoded as a single string of 3,200 characters
(one character per tweet). There is a vast number of algorithms
and techniques to draw upon for the analysis of digital DNA
sequences. Indeed, many of the techniques developed in the
field of bioinformatics for the analysis of biological DNA can
be carried over to study the characteristics of digital DNA as
well.
In the following, we show the usefulness of our approach
with a possible application to the detection of Twitter spam-
bots, namely computer programs that control social accounts
with the goal to mimic real users and send these users
unsolicited messages [6]. Starting from two Twitter datasets
where genuine and spambot accounts are a priori known,
we leverage DNA sequence characterization to let recurrent
patterns emerge. We show how groups of spambots share
common patterns, as opposed to groups of genuine accounts.
As a concrete application of this outcome, we demonstrate
how to apply the methodology to tell apart spambots from
genuine accounts, within an unknown set of accounts.
III. INTRODUCING DIGITAL DNA FINGERPRINTING
Biological DNA fingerprinting is a technique employed
by forensic scientists to identify suspects from their DNA.
Similarly to forensic analysis, we describe a digital DNA fin-
gerprinting technique for spambots detection on social media.
While this is just one of the possible applications for digital
DNA, it contributes to understand how our methodology can
help in practice.
Academics and platform administrators are constantly strug-
gling to keep pace with evolving spambots. New waves of
malicious accounts present different and advanced features,
making their detection with existing systems extremely chal-
lenging [4], [6].
This is the case with the new family of spambots that
emerged on Twitter during the last Mayoral election in Rome,
2014. One of the runners-up made use of almost 1,000
automated accounts for his electoral campaign in order to
pubblicize his policies. Surprisingly, these automated accounts
were extremely hard to distinguish from genuine ones. Each
profile contained detailed personal information and had thou-
sands of genuine followers and friends. Furthermore, they
showed a tweeting behavior apparently similar to that of
genuine accounts, with a few tweets posted every day – mainly
quotes from popular people. However, every time the political
candidate posted a new tweet from his official account, all
the spambots retweeted it in a time span of just a few
minutes. Thus, the candidate was able to reach many more
accounts than his own direct followers and managed to alter
Twitter engagement metrics during the electoral campaign. We
found similar phenomena to be widespread also outside Italy.
Specifically, here we consider two groups of social spambots:
(i) bot retweeters of the Italian candidate (Bot1), and (ii) bot
accounts spamming URLs pointing to several products on sale
on the Amazon.com e-commerce platform (Bot2).
In contrast with classification and supervised approaches,
we devise an unsupervised way to detect spambots, by compar-
ing their behavior with the aim of finding similarities between
automated accounts. We model the behavior of the two groups
of spambots via their digital DNA and we compare it to that
of a sample of genuine accounts. We exploit digital DNA to
study the behavior of groups of users following the intuition
that, because of their automated nature, spambots are likely to
present higher similarities in their digital DNA with respect to
the more heterogeneous genuine users.
A. Mining groups of digital DNA sequences
The basic assumption of the digital DNA fingerprinting
technique is to consider behaviors as sequences of actions
and to characterize and detect social spambots by grouping
similar sequences. Our approach thus falls within the broad
field of sequential data mining, yet it presents differences from
the tasks commonly performed when working with sequential
data. Sequences are ordered lists of symbols from an alphabet
B, namely s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, with si ∈ B and are used in
information retrieval, part-of-speech tagging, genomics, time-
series analysis – to name but a few. Tasks commonly per-
formed with such sequences are those of sequential supervised
learning, time-series prediction, sequence classification. For
instance, in sequential supervised learning, given a sequence
s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, the goal is to find a sequence of labels
l = {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, where each label is associated to an
element of the original sequence. Well-known techniques to
perform this task are conditional random fields and hidden
Markov models. Instead, in time series prediction, the goal
is to find the element st+1, given a starting sequence s =
{s1, s2, . . . , st}. For instance, this goal could be achieved by
employing a model taken from the broad family of statistical
(auto-)regressive techniques. Finally, sequence classification is
concerned with assigning a single label l to a whole sequence
s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, following a supervised approach. In-
stead, here our goal is to analyze a set of unlabeled sequences,
in order to find commonalities and differences between them,
by exploiting the sequential information related to user actions,
which is captured within digital DNA sequences. To this
regard, our task resembles that of unsupervised sequence
clustering. However, it further differs from traditional machine
learning clustering since we exploit sequential data. Indeed,
our sequences are ordered data representations, while feature
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vectors exploited in traditional clustering are unordered (i.e.,
features are not ordered in feature vectors and the ordering
is not exploited in the analysis). Moreover, our sequences
are variable-length vectors of symbols drawn from a limited
alphabet (i.e., strings), rather than fixed-length numeric vec-
tors. Thus, traditional distance/similarity metrics for numeric
vectors (such as those typically used in clustering) are not
applicable in our case. Working with ordered and variable-
length data representations also marks a difference with other
techniques recently employed for the behavioral analysis of
groups of users, such as those based on hashing [7] and graph
mining [5].
IV. DIGITAL DNA FINGERPRINTING
FOR SPAMBOT DETECTION
A. Characterizing spambot behavior
The process of digital DNA fingerprinting has four main
steps: (i) acquisition of behavioral data; (ii) extraction of DNA
sequences; (iii) comparison of DNA sequences; (iv) evaluation.
In order to perform a rigorous evaluation of our detec-
tion technique, we created datasets of verified spambots and
genuine Twitter accounts. All the accounts of our datasets
have undergone manual verification. Specifically, 50.05% (991
accounts) of Bot1 accounts and 89.29% (464 accounts) of
Bot2 accounts were certified as spambots. Then, we built
a dataset of human accounts by randomly contacting Twitter
users and by asking them simple questions in natural language.
All the 3,474 accounts that answered were certified as human.
For all the 4,929 accounts of our datasets we then collected
behavioral data, by crawling the content of their Twitter
timelines.
The second step is the extraction of the digital DNA of the
accounts – that is, associating each account to a string that
encodes its behavioral information. Digital DNA sequences
can be extracted in different ways, according to the kind of
information to be modeled. Similarly to feature engineering in
machine learning, catching the right granularity for modeling
behaviors might lead to better detection results. For the sake
of experimentation, we modeled the accounts’ behavior in two
ways and we evaluated which one better captures the nature of
automated accounts. In the first experiment, we considered the
types of tweets shared (tweet type DNA). Every tweet in the
account’s timeline is encoded with a different character: A for
a simple tweet, T for a reply and C for a retweet. In the second
experiment, we considered the content of tweets (tweet content
DNA). We designed the base A for tweets with URLs, T for
tweets with hashtags, C for tweets with mentions, G for tweets
with media (pictures, videos), X for tweets with a combination
of the previous entities, and N for tweets with none of them
(plain-text). Since each Twitter timeline is made up of at most
3,200 tweets, we obtained digital DNA sequences counting up
to 3,200 characters.
As a third step, we study similarities among the DNA of
our accounts. We consider similarity as a proxy for automation
and, thus, an exceptionally high level of similarity among a
large group of accounts serves as a red flag for anomalous
behaviors. We quantify similarity by looking at the Longest
Common Substring (LCS) among digital DNA sequences. We
rely on a linear time algorithm [10] that is based on the
generalized suffix tree. Given m strings, the algorithm is able
to find, for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m, the longest substring in common
to at least k strings. Then, given m DNA sequences and the
length of the longest substring common to k of them, we can
derive which accounts have such longest substring in common
(i.e., which are those k accounts). As the number k of accounts
grows, the length of the longest substring common to all of
them (LCS) shortens. Thus, it is likely to find a long LCS
among a few accounts rather than among large groups. Thus,
the rationale behind our analysis is that if the LCS is long
when k grows, then the accounts that share that LCS have a
suspiciously similar behavior.
To verify our claim, we computed the LCS in the datasets
of certified spambots and genuine accounts for every k. To
be statistically sound, we compared groups of the same size
by randomly undersampling genuine accounts to match the
number of spambots. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show results of the
comparison of tweet type DNA sequences, while figures 1(c)
and 1(d) show the results for tweet content DNA sequences.
All plots of Figure 1 show the length of LCS for all the
possible group sizes: for example, in Figure 1(a) there exists
a group of 400 accounts in Bot1 with a substring of length
774 in common. From figures 1(a) and 1(b) it is clear that the
LCS of both the groups of spambots are rather long even when
the number of accounts grows. This is strikingly evident for
Bot2 (spammers of Amazon.com products), see Figure 1(b).
In contrast, genuine accounts show little to no similarity. For
both the spambot groups we observe a sudden drop in LCS
length when k gets close to the group size. Instead, the human
group has an exponential decay and it rapidly reaches the
smallest values of the LCS length.
Figures 1(c) and 1(d) are related to tweet content DNA
sequences and results are noticeably different from those
obtained with tweet type DNA. All the LCS curves have much
lower values, however the biggest difference between tweet
content DNA and tweet type DNA is shown for Bot2. While
tweet type DNA models almost perfectly the high similarity
of Bot2 accounts, tweet content DNA is unable to show
a significative difference between genuine and bot accounts.
These results suggest that modeling the behavior of Twitter
accounts according to the type of tweets, rather than to their
content, is more effective for discriminating Bot2 spambots.
B. Uncovering novel Twitter spambots
As shown before, properly extracted digital DNA sequences
provide evidence of similar activities in large groups. In turn,
this can lead to suspect a high degree of automation for those
accounts behaving in a similar way. Building on the promising
results obtained with tweet type DNA, in the following we
exploit the characteristics of LCS curves to effectively detect
groups of Twitter spambots. Our detection technique can be
applied to a group of unlabeled accounts to check whether
accounts with a suspiciously similar behavior are present. In a
group with mixed bot and genuine accounts, almost only bot
accounts will have long DNA substrings in common. Thus, by
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(a) Tweet type DNA similarity between retweeters of the political
candidate and genuine accounts.
(b) Tweet type DNA similarity between spammers of Amazon.com
products and genuine accounts.
(c) Tweet content DNA similarity between retweeters of the polit-
ical candidate and genuine accounts.
(d) Tweet content DNA similarity between spammers of Ama-
zon.com products and genuine accounts.
Fig. 1. Comparison between the LCS lengths of the digital DNA of different groups of Twitter accounts.
identifying the group of accounts that share a long LCS, we
can obtain a set of suspicious accounts.
Henceforth, Test-set1 and Test-set2 refer to unla-
beled groups where genuine accounts have been mixed with
the ones from Bot1 and Bot2 respectively.
The plots in figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the length of LCS
for all the possible values of k accounts in Test-set1 and
Test-set2. In these plots, we looked for the points where
the LCS curves exhibit a sudden drop to very low values,
since those points might represent thresholds between groups
of similar accounts. Observing Figure 2(a), we can see that
there is a continuous decrease in the LCS length as the number
of accounts grows, and a sudden drop occurs just before
reaching the 1,000 accounts. The drop is even more evident in
Figure 2(b) where there is a steep fall of the curve just before
400 accounts. LCS curves in both plots keep approaching to
1 as the number of accounts grows. The steep drops of LCS
curves highlight areas where the length of the LCS remains
practically unchanged even for significantly different numbers
of accounts considered. In fact, such plateaux in LCS curves
are strictly related to homogeneous groups of highly similar
accounts. Note that it is possible to observe multiple plateaux
in a single LCS curve, as in the case of Figure 2(a). This
represents a situation where multiple (sub-)groups exist among
the whole set of considered accounts. Furthermore, the steeper
and the more pronounced the drop in the LCS curve, the more
different are the two groups of accounts split by that drop.
Building on these interesting characteristics, we devised
a methodology to exploit drops in LCS curves in order to
identify groups of similar accounts. Specifically, we exploit
the derivative of LCS curves ∆ LCS∆ accounts to highlight the points
corresponding to the steepest drops. Such points, appearing as
negative peaks in the derivative plot, represent good candidate
splitting points to detect groups of dissimilar accounts. Note
that it is possible to obtain several candidate splitting points,
which might also be ranked according to the derivative value
(i.e., how steep is the corresponding drop). Then, a hierar-
chical top-down (i.e., divisive) approach may be applied by
repeatedly splitting the set of accounts based on the ranked
candidate points, leading to a dendrogram-like structure. For
instance, this approach can be exploited in situations where
the LCS curve exhibits multiple plateaux and steep drops.
Thus, analyzing the LCS curves of figures 2(a) and 2(b),
we identified the best splitting points and we assumed that
the suspiciously similar accounts are the ones that share the
longest LCS just before such splitting points, namely the
983 accounts with LCS around 400 for Test-set1 and the
400 accounts with LCS of around 1750 for Test-set2.
Finally, we evaluated the effectiveness of the DNA-based
detection technique by considering the following evaluation
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(a) DNA similarity of a mixed group of genuine accounts and
retweeters of the political candidate (Test-set1).
(b) DNA similarity of a mixed group of genuine accounts and
spammers of Amazon.com products (Test-set2).
detection results evaluation metrics
detection system TP TN FP FN Precision Recall Specificity Accuracy F-Measure MCC
Yang et al. [4] 169 811 131 822 0.563 0.170 0.860 0.506 0.261 0.043
Miller et al. [8] 355 657 285 636 0.555 0.358 0.698 0.526 0.435 0.059
Ahmed et al. [9] 935 888 54 56 0.945 0.944 0.945 0.943 0.944 0.886
DNA fingerprinting 963 924 18 28 0.982 0.972 0.981 0.976 0.977 0.952
(c) Evaluation of spambot detection results for a mixed group of genuine accounts and retweeters of the political candidate (Test-set1).
detection results evaluation metrics
detection system TP TN FP FN Precision Recall Specificity Accuracy F-Measure MCC
Yang et al. [4] 190 397 71 274 0.727 0.409 0.848 0.629 0.524 0.287
Miller et al. [8] 142 306 162 322 0.467 0.306 0.654 0.481 0.370 -0.043
Ahmed et al. [9] ] 428 427 41 30 0.913 0.935 0.912 0.923 0.923 0.847
DNA fingerprinting 398 468 0 66 1.000 0.858 1.000 0.929 0.923 0.867
(d) Evaluation of spambot detection results for a mixed group of genuine accounts and spammers of Amazon.com products (Test-set2).
]: With regards to the feature set of [9], a few accounts had null values for all the features thus resulting in the impossibility to apply the
clustering algorithm to such accounts.
Fig. 2. DNA similarity of the two test-sets and evaluation of spambot detection results.
metrics: Precision, Recall, Specificity, Accuracy, F-Measure,
and Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC). To thoroughly
evaluate the DNA fingerprinting technique we compared our
detection results with those obtained by several different state-
of-the-art approaches, namely the supervised one by Yang et
al. [4] and the unsupervised approaches by Miller et al. [8]
and by Ahmed et al. [9]. The work presented in [4] provides
a machine learning classifier that infers whether a Twitter
account is genuine or spambot by relying on account’s re-
lationships, tweeting timing and level of automation. We have
reproduced such classifier since the authors kindly provided
us their training set. Instead, works in [8] and [9] define a set
of machine learning features and apply clustering algorithms.
Specifically, in [8] the authors propose modified versions
of the DenStream and StreamKM++ algorithms (respectively
based on DBSCAN and k-means) and apply them for the
detection of spambots over the Twitter stream. Ahmed et al. [9]
exploit the Euclidean distance between feature vectors to
build a similarity graph of the accounts. Graph clustering and
community detection algorithms are then applied to identify
groups of similar accounts in the graph.
Tables 2(c) and 2(d) show the results of this comparison.
Notably, the DNA fingerprinting detection technique outper-
forms all other approaches, achieving MCC = 0.952 for
Test-set1 and MCC = 0.867 for Test-set2. Specifi-
cally, there is a clear performance gap between the approaches
of [4] and [8] with respect to our proposed approach and
that of [9]. The supervised approach by Yang et al. [4]
proved unable to accurately distinguish spambots from genuine
accounts, as demonstrated by the considerable number of
false negatives (FN) and the resulting very low Recall. This
result supports our initial claim that this new wave of bots is
surprisingly similar to genuine accounts: they are exceptionally
hard to detect if considered one by one. Moreover, also the
unsupervised approach in [8] provided unsatisfactory results.
Among the 126 features proposed in [8], 95 are based on
the textual content of tweets. However, novel social spambots
tweet contents similar to that of genuine accounts (e.g.,
retweets of genuine tweets and famous quotes). Instead, the
approach in [9] proved effective in detecting our considered
spambots, showing an MCC = 0.886 for Test-set1 and
MCC = 0.847 for Test-set2. Employing only 7 features,
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[9] focuses on retweets, hashtags, mentions, and URLs, thus
analyzing the accounts along the dimensions exploited by
these spammers. However, although achieving an overall good
performance for the considered spambots, the approach in [9]
might lack reusability across other groups of spambots with
different behaviors, such as those perpetrating a follower
fraud [5],[11]. Instead, our DNA-inspired technique is flexible
enough to highlight suspicious similarities among groups of
accounts without focusing on specific characteristics.
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the state-of-the-
art approaches for spambots detection require a large number
of data-demanding features. For instance, approaches that are
based on graph mining have been proved to be more demand-
ing in terms of data that is needed in order to perform the
detection [11]. Instead, the DNA fingerprinting technique only
exploits Twitter timeline data to perform spambots detection.
Furthermore, it does not require a training phase and can
be employed pretty much like a clustering algorithm, in an
unsupervised fashion.
We also envision the possibility to exploit results of our
DNA-inspired technique as a feature in a more complex detec-
tion system. Indeed, different types of DNA (such as the tweet
type DNA and the tweet content DNA) can be exploited to
model user behaviors along different directions. Then, results
of these models could be used simultaneously in an ensemble
or voting system. To this regard, the already interesting results
achieved by exploiting only one type of digital DNA, namely
tweet type DNA, might represent promising ground for further
experimentation and research.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a novel methodology to
characterize and study online user behaviors. The novelty of
our proposal relies in modeling behaviors in a DNA-inspired
fashion. Hence, we enable analysts to leverage a powerful set
of tools – that have been developed over decades for DNA
analysis – to validate their working hypotheses on online user
behaviors. To show the viability of our proposal, we have
performed an extensive experimental campaign using Twitter
as a benchmark and targeting spambots detection. Results
show that our proposal outperforms best-of-breed algorithms
that are commonly employed for this task. Finally, we also
argue that the proposed methodology could be used in other
contexts as well, hence paving the way for further research.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Tsakalidis, S. Papadopoulos, A. Cristea, and Y. Kompatsiaris,
“Predicting elections for multiple countries using twitter and polls,”
Intelligent Systems, IEEE, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 10–17, Mar 2015.
[2] K. Li and Y. Fu, “Prediction of human activity by discovering temporal
sequence patterns,” Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 36, no. 8, pp. 1644–1657, Aug 2014.
[3] H. Liu, J. Han, and H. Motoda, “Uncovering deception in social media,”
Social Netw. Analys. Mining, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 162, 2014.
[4] C. Yang, R. Harkreader, and G. Gu, “Empirical evaluation and new
design for fighting evolving twitter spammers,” Information Forensics
and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1280–1293, 2013.
[5] M. Jiang, P. Cui, A. Beutel, C. Faloutsos, and S. Yang, “Catching
synchronized behaviors in large networks: A graph mining approach,”
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD), 2016
(to appear).
[6] X. Hu, J. Tang, and H. Liu, “Online social spammer detection,” in AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014, pp. 59–65.
[7] M. Ou, P. Cui, J. Wang, F. Wang, and W. Zhu, “Probabilistic attributed
hashing,” in AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015, pp. 2894–
2900.
[8] Z. Miller, B. Dickinson, W. Deitrick, W. Hu, and A. H. Wang, “Twitter
spammer detection using data stream clustering,” Information Sciences,
vol. 260, pp. 64–73, 2014.
[9] F. Ahmed and M. Abulaish, “A generic statistical approach for spam
detection in online social networks,” Computer Communications, vol. 36,
no. 10, pp. 1120–1129, 2013.
[10] M. Arnold and E. Ohlebusch, “Linear time algorithms for generalizations
of the longest common substring problem,” Algorithmica, vol. 60, no. 4,
pp. 806–818, 2011.
[11] S. Cresci, R. Di Pietro, M. Petrocchi, A. Spognardi, and M. Tesconi,
“Fame for sale: Efficient detection of fake Twitter followers,” Decision
Support Systems, vol. 80, pp. 56–71, 2015.
Stefano Cresci is a Ph.D. student at University of Pisa, Information Engi-
neering Dept., and a research fellow at IIT-CNR in Pisa, Italy. His research
interests include social media mining and knowledge discovery.
Email: s.cresci@iit.cnr.it
Dr. Roberto Di Pietro is with the Nokia Bell Labs, Paris, France. His research
interests include security, privacy, distributed systems, computer forensics, and
analytics. He is also affiliated with University of Padua, Maths Dept., and IIT-
CNR, Pisa, Italy.
Email: roberto.di_pietro@nokia.com
Dr. Marinella Petrocchi is a researcher at IIT-CNR, Pisa, Italy. Her research
interests include data privacy, personalization on the internet, data quality and
trustworthiness.
Email: m.petrocchi@iit.cnr.it
Dr. Angelo Spognardi is an assistant professor at DTU Compute, Denmark.
His main research interests are on social networks modeling and analysis,
network protocol security and privacy.
Email: angsp@dtu.dk
Dr. Maurizio Tesconi is a researcher at IIT-CNR in Pisa, Italy. His research
interests cover semantic web, social network analysis and mining, visual
analytics, lexical resources technologies and paperless solutions for the public
administration sector.
Email: m.tesconi@iit.cnr.it
